cialis 10mg coupon celebrex dosage 100mg cytotec order generic valtrex 1000mg generic synthroid doses order uk viagra 100 mg viagra price generic zoloft online when generic viagra lexapro 30 mg ocd lisinopril generic available propranolol 20 mg uses phenergan suppositories 25 mg taking 2 5mg levitra buy online strattera strattera 40 mg tratamiento viagra plus 50mg zithromax 500 mg sport cialis generic paypal buy viagra warszawa slideme buy cialis viagra online anavar augmentin 500 mg dosis generic cialis lowest bad generic cialis xenical 120 mg controindicazioni diflucan 150 mg kapseli obat propranolol 40 mg order viagra chemist viagra generic now generic zithromax online lexapro 20mg dosage 20 mg cialis dose viagra generico mastercard cialis 20 mg diskuze levitra 20mg wiki prednisone 2o mg buy viagra china order cialis me prezzo cialis 20mg lisinopril 2.5 mg e25 cialis superactive 100 mg cheap drugs viagra lasix 40 mgs generic cialis montreal cialis 36 hr mg clomid buy ireland thuoc glucophage 850mg 30 mg lexapro anxiety pfizer zoloft 50mg buy prednisone 50 mg generic viagra april 2012 zithromax posologie 900mg canadian viagra 100mg synthroid 0.5 mg cod generic cialis lexapro 10mg online levitra 20mg fass lisinopril 10 mg recall diflucan 250mg zithromax 250 mg annostus indiangeneric cialis generic viagra blueberry 100 efectos cialis 10 mg generic viagra vega buy cialis 5mg opiniones cialis 20 mg cialis 20mg cost viagra online real kamagra generic viagra combining 5mg cialis levitra 5mg bestellen cheapest viagra pharmacy lexapro 20 mg cena levitra 10 mg dispersable tetracycline hydrochloride 500mg strattera europe online kamagra 200 mg safe metformin 250 mg xr strattera 60 mg bestellen cytotec 200 online propranolol 40 mg tabletki vigorex 50mg viagra generic brand propecia hydrochlorothiazide 75 mg foros cialis generico generico do viagra 2012 generico al viagra buy zithromax nz viagra online poland prednisone 20mg online chinese cheap cialis buy zoloft sertraline buy propecia mumbai 200 mgs of viagra efectos lasix 20 mg buy celebrex now wellbutrin eating disorders 20 mg propranolol safe buying viagra alternatives augmentin 1000 mg dosierung levitra 10mg cialis professional generico pfizer 50mg viagra cheap cialis professional xenical australia online metformin generic brand eczane online viagra strattera drug generic clomid 150 mg zwanger generic wellbutrin walgreens beli generic priligy viagra 100mg original zovirax 800 mg iv strattera 60 mg yahoo levitra 10 mg opinie cipro 1000 mg yanetkileri xenical 120mg coupons buy clomid store lexapro authorized generic cialis 5 mg gr kamagra sklep online tetracycline wolff 500 mg cialis 20 mg pricing order zithromax powder nexium generic 80mg. lexapro online 5mg valtrex prescription online lasix 20mg tab viagra online sklep 100 mg viagra etkisi cialis 5 mg 28 comprimidos bupropion generic wellbutrin doxycycline 100mg sun generic propecia singapore zithromax 500 mg 2 tablets zithromax 1 mg 2 packets 5mg lexapro effective 2013 thuoc metformin 850 mg diflucan 100 mg generic propecia buy slovakia levitra generic problems levitra 40 mg paypal generico xenical orlistat viagra split 100 mg amoxil bd 850mg cipro 10mg efectos zithromax capsules 1000mg doxycycline buy paypal generic viagra when zithromax cheap canada levitra 5mg bayer prednisone 10mg tabs doxycycline 200mg cena cialis 2.5mg canada 250 mg liquid celebrex xenical online europe generic for zithromax nolvadex buy sydney buy viagra pessaries zithromax syrup 100 mg prednisone 20 mg ratiopharm generic lexapro lawsuits doxycycline 400 mg wiki clomid 50mg bleeding prednisone 20 mg benefits doxycycline 100mg eczema amoxil 875 mg dosage lisinopril tablets 2.5mg metformin 1000 mg dosierung buy cialis now cipro 600 mg iv buy internet cialis nexium mups 400 mg cialis online belgrade 25mg clomid triplets 40 mg strattera capsule glucophage 500 mg uk buy nolvadex 10mg generic wellbutrin sandoz zithromax buy canada cialis 5 mg online generic lexapro formulation lexapro 10mg emagrece zithromax 500 mg preis celebrex 200 mg prescription cost metformin 500 mg levitra purchase generic directions cialis 20mg lexapro 20 mg coupon cytotec 200 mg tab lexapro non generic cialis 100mg forum lisinopril generic tablets online propecia cheap buy levitra manila phenergan 12.5 mg im buy viagra site assunzione viagra 25 mg kamagra cheapest au lisinopril 5 mg purpose nexium 40 mg posologie 150 mg diflucan safe lisinopril 10 mg buy cialis 5mg online propecia online thailand is 150 mg viagra valtrex 500mg kosten generic viagra best levitra 20 mg talbet buy zithromax com generic cialis 10 omg lexapro 5 mg review augmentin vien 625mg generic cialis 75 mg normal cialis mg viagra online nas cialis farmacias online erythromycin creme buy kamagra 100mg uputstvo zithromax 500mg std viagra 100mg info nolvadex legal buy buy 10 mg nolvadex zithromax online paypal generic cialis women dapoxetine order wellbutrin 450mg medicamento buspar 10 mg glucophage 500 mg dosage erythromycin thiocyanate buyer nexium substitutes generic prednisone 5mg asthma cyprus buy viagra bactrim de 800 mg valtrex cheap online synthroid nombre generico hydrochlorothiazide 25 mg reviews 60 mg propranolol overdose viagra generico tipos lisinopril 1 mg buy cialis durban levitra generic40 mg lasix strengths 25mg lisinopril 20 mg celebrex 200 mg contraindicaciones metformin ordering sertraline zoloft generic doxycycline monohydrate generics cheapest priligy online diflucan pill 150 mg cialis 5mg czech buy xenical usa strattera generic release tranny generic viagra lisinopril 2.5mg cost nexium prospect 20mg zithromax online buy zovirax acyclovir 200mg generico del celebrex 2500 mg metformin viagra 20mg viagra y genericos cialis 20 mg 8 compresse nolvadex 20mg buy kamagra 200 mg dose buy viagra jhb clomid 50 mg testosterone cheapest cialis daily quantum cialis generica viagra buy sildenafil cialis 5mg effect 40mg cialis reviews zoloft generic online zithromax 500 mg vial 100 mg prednisone erythromycin tablets 250 mg celebrex 100 mg bijsluiter chepest 800 mg viagra 200 mg viagra dosage prednisone steroid 10 mg australia doxycycline 50 mg strattera cheap cialis online paypall buying cialis 20mg buy clomid dbol nexium generic pills propranolol 20 mg ansiedade prednisone purchase online hydrochlorothiazide 12.5 mg alcohol augmentin 875 mg prospect prix doxycycline 100 mg cipro generic cost xenical de 60 mg metformin hcl 250 mg xenical 120mg pret identifying generic viagra vardenafil generic levitra zithromax sachets 300 mg wellbutrin 200 mg reviews hungary buy cialis wellbutrin vs generic 5mg cialis cost prednisone 10mg dosage cialis 20 mg secable augmentin comprimate 875 mg cialis 10mg prices 15 20 mg lexapro ordering generic viagra levitra voucher online levitra online costco propecia 0.5mg malaysia strattera anxiety disorder glucophage order 10 mg generic levitra prednisone 5 mg pack 60 mg cialis viagra 100mg generic online cheap viagra cialis 5 mg montreal 200 mg clomid online zovirax prescription generic lisinopril zestril 20 mg doxycycline 250 mg capsule azitromicina zithromax 500mg 200 mg cialis tablets lexapro generic version2013 generic dapoxetine 60mg celebrex generic dosing tetracycline hcl 500 mg propranolol canada online viagra generic oregon wellbutrin generic alcohol kamagra jel 100mg 1700 mg of metformin clomid 200mg multiples metformin overdose 3000 mg 30mg prednisone day zithromax 500mg online cialis generic medication 1 mg prednisone safe propecia online legal 100 mg prednisone daily generic wellbutrin buy buy Cialis 10 cipro far 500mg generic canada cialis online viagra dubai wockhardt lisinopril 5mg cheap lisinopril hctz viagra compresse 100 mg cialis 20 mg 2 comprimidos synthroid 0.05mg tab buying viagra bangkok buy brand priligy phenergan 25mg tablets lisinopril 20 mg fainting generique levitra 20mg hydrochlorothiazide cap 12.5mg propranolol ratiopharm 40 mg cipro 750 mg 250 mg doxycycline acne glucophage 850 mg dosage cipro 500 mg prostat doxycycline capsules 50 mg generic levitra odt tadalafil 20 mg cialis cheap cialis canada cialis 10 mg foro levitra professional generico diflucan 150 mg uti buy cipro 500mg viagra online manly indian cialis online buy clomid medicine augmentin 500 mg generic buy doxycycline 150 mg chinese 200mg viagra order clomid online levitra 400mgs tablets nexium 40 mg tb buy viagra lincoln purchase generic clomid celebrex 200 mg pfizer kamagra 100 mg jelly cialis dosage 800 mg levitra generico uk cialis hungary 5mg nexium 40 mg prezzo celebrex 200mg cap amoxil 500 mg mims cost 120 mg strattera cheap lexapro 20 mg cialis online ireland viagra 50 o 100 mg propranolol wzf 40 mg viagra 100mg duration strattera 40 mg generic lisinopril 2.5 mg buy viagra online shipping zovirax tab 400 mg buy clomid england viagra 25 mg france cialis 20mg generika 25 mg zoloft sleepy viagra 50 mg cialis tadalafil 20 mg 30 buy cialis portugal buy levitra 5 mg buy kamagra online online original viagra reputable generic cialis blue lisinopril 10 mg viagra 200mg.com nexium 40mg patent cialis da 60 mg cialis 20 mg use experience generic valtrex cialis online london online purchase wellbutrin nexium 40mg instructions generica de xenical clomid 0.1 mg generic augmentin cost zithromax 500mg keterangan cipro 500 mg uses nexium 20 mg presentacion cialis 2 5 mg funziona viagra money order 50 mg viagra dosage erythromycin base 500 mg order viagra rx 5 mg dose lexapro 8 doxycycline 100mg generic zovirax canada order Cialis Jelly 20 clomid 150mg triplets hamilelikte augmentin 1000 mg viagra tablets 100mg citalopram 10 mg bactrim buy viagra order mail about diflucan 150 mg khasiat metformin 500mg kamagra 100mg montreal zoloft order cialis 10 mg originale cialis 40 mg india buy cialis 20 mg metformin 2250 mg valtrex 500 mg tabletten sevrage zoloft 50 mg herbal viagra 450 mg viagra paypal bbuy twins 150 mg clomid lasix 20 mgvia nebulizer canada generic lexapro generic diflucan online acheter viagra 50mg diflucan 100 mg uses cheap 40 mg levitra strattera 25 mg pret cheap 100mg viagra prednisone panafcort 5mg cialis 600 mg cialis generic kopen cialis 75 mg bactrim vs generic cialis 10 mg buy generic lexapro 20mg bought propecia online wellbutrin lawsuit generic cialis 2.5 mg usa clomid cost 100mg composicion cialis 5 mg xenical generico dosis buying valtrex uk reviews xenical 120mg cialis 2.5 cheap levitra generic availability cialis generic overnight cheapest viagra forum us cialis online generics for buspar alternative viagra online generic viagra italy buy doxycycline 2 weeks cialis tablet 10mg zithromax 500 mg 5 days orlistat xenical buy cialis 2.5 vs 5 mg propecia online hairlosstalk viagra online cluj buy viagra patpal cheapest clomid au levitra 20mg pills 20 mg doxycycline tablets cipro drug online cialis 5 eller 10 mg lexapro 20mg day
Home All Articles Dosh: MLB's Revenue-Sharing and the Luxury Tax Are Not One in the Same

Like Shoot to Thrill - An AC/DC Tribute on Facebook!

An authentic tribute of AC/DC that covers the best of the Bon Scott era and the best of Brian Johnson's material

Who's Online?

We have 471 guests online

Atom RSS

Dosh: MLB's Revenue-Sharing and the Luxury Tax Are Not One in the Same PDF Print E-mail
User Rating: / 115
PoorBest 
Articles & Opinion
Written by Kristi Dosh   
Monday, 19 April 2010 11:48

The Biz of BaseballWhile we have run a prior article on this subject, guest author Kristi Dosh of It's a Swing and a Miss has gone into further detail on how revenue-sharing and the Competitve Balance Tax (Luxury Tax) functions in Major League Baseball. Enjoy. -- Maury Brown, President, Business of Sports Network, BizofBaseball.com


I’ve spent the past four years studying, writing and guest lecturing on revenue sharing and internal taxation in Major League Baseball. Accordingly, I’m fascinated by the debate raging in the media between Randy Levine, President of the Yankees, and Mark Attanasio, the owner of the Brewers. What really caught my eye though was the confusion between revenue sharing and the competitive balance tax. As I’ve guest lectured on these topics over the past four years, I’ve found that even your most avid baseball fan doesn’t generally know or understand the difference.

So, before I explain the difference, let me set the stage for you…

It all started with this comment to USA Today by Mark Attanasio, owner of the Milwaukee Brewers:

“We’re struggling to sign Prince Fielder, and the Yankees infield is making more than our team.”

Enter Randy Levine, President of the Yankees, who said this to ESPNNewYork.com:

“I’m sorry that my friend Mark continues to whine about his running the Brewers. We play by all the rules and there doesn’t seem to be any complaints when teams such as the Brewers receive hundreds of millions of dollars that they get from us in revenue sharing the last few years. Take some of that money that you get from us and use that to sign your players.”

“The question that should be asked is: Where has the hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue sharing gone?”

Ok, I’m on board so far. It’s the same old David versus the Yankees story as always in baseball. The real problem comes in how the story has been framed by many media outlets.

Gabe Lacques, who wrote the USA Today piece, wrote this in his article:

“According to the Biz of Baseball, the Yankees have accounted for $175 million – or 92% – of all revenue-sharing payments since revenue sharing was instituted.”

Andrew Marchand, who wrote the ESPNNewYork.com story, similarly stated:

“In the initial seven years of the luxury tax, the Yankees have paid teams nearly $175 million in revenue sharing, according to the BizofBaseball.com. That is 92 percent of the total revenue sharing that has been doled out.”

Enter confusion, stage right. Revenue sharing and the luxury tax (which, by the way, was renamed the “competitive balance tax” in the 2002 CBA, which covered 2003-2006) are two completely separate concepts. Aside from the Yankees having to pay both, they have very little in common.

SELECT READ MORE TO SEE DETAILS ON REVENUE SHARING AND THE LUXURY TAX

Revenue Sharing

Revenue sharing was first approved by the owners in 1994 and included in the 1996-2000 Collective Bargaining Agreement, presumably as an alternative to a salary cap, which was ruled out by the MLBPA. Revenue sharing is based on a club’s Net Local Revenue for a given year. Understanding what Net Local Revenue is takes the reading of no less than five definitions in the CBA, but I’m going to provide you the overly simplified version. Net Local Revenue is Local Revenue (gross revenue from all revenue areas like ticket sales, concessions, etc. minus Central Revenue, which is national television and radio, etc.) minus Actual Stadium Expense (which is exactly what it sounds like, the actual monies paid out by a club for its stadium).

The 1996-2000 CBA phased in revenue sharing with the use of three different plans:

Split Pool Plan: each club put in 20% of their Net Local Revenue. Those monies were then divided 75/25, with 75% being split evenly amongst all clubs and 25% being split only between those clubs with a Net Local Revenue below the mean for all clubs. The 25% was not split evenly between those clubs below the mean, but based on their distance from the mean.

Straight Pool Plan: each club put in 39% of their Net Local Revenue and it was split evenly with all clubs.

Hybrid Plan: evaluated the result each club would have under each of the above plans and then assigned the plan that was better for that club as a payor/payee. So, if the Yankees would pay out less under the Split Pool Plan, they were assigned that plan. If the Royals would receive more under the Straight Pool Plan, they were assigned that plan.

Then, to make it even more confusing, the plan was implemented on a percentage basis:

  • 1996: 60% Hybrid Plan
  • 1997: 60% Hybrid Plan
  • 1998: 80% Split Pool Plan
  • 1999: 85% Split Pool Plan
  • 2000: 100% Split Pool Plan

So, in 1996, a club received or paid 60% of the total result under the Hybrid Plan. The result was that $50 million was moved around in 1996. By 2002, that number would be $169 million.

In 2002, revenue sharing was simplified under the next CBA. The Straight Pool Plan was in effect for the length of the CBA at a rate of 34%. So, each club put in 34% of their Net Local Revenue each year, and then the pool was divided evenly between all of the clubs. A Central Fund component was added, which called for 41.066% of the total amount transferred from payor clubs to payee clubs to be pulled from baseball’s Central Fund and divided between payee clubs whose average Net Local Revenue over the past three years fell below the average for all clubs over that same time period. The amount distributed was to be deduced from distributions to be made to payor clubs at the end of the season. There’s a very specific mathematical formula for this in the CBA, but I won’t go into it here.

I know you’ve all heard the grumblings about teams receiving more in revenue sharing than the spend (*cough* Marlins *cough*). An example I use in my lectures is the 2005 Florida Marlins. Payroll was cut by nearly 75% to a league-leading low of $14,998,500, more than $20 million below the next lowest payroll. Meanwhile, their cut of revenue sharing was reported to be $31 million, leaving them $16 million for other “baseball-related” activities. That’s the only parameter given in the CBA for spending revenue sharing dollars, by the way: that it be used for “baseball-related activities.”

The 2006 CBA contained a revenue sharing provision very similar to the 2002 CBA. The percentage was decreased from 34% to 31% because of increased revenues league-wide, but the other provisions remain mostly unchanged.

Time for another example I use in my lectures. The Royals revenue sharing receipts doubled from 2002-2007, but payroll only rose by 6%. Meanwhile, the team value has risen from $96m to $282m. Just food for thought.

Need dessert to go with that? Consider this quote by Mr. Attanasio:

“We do get a piece of revenue sharing, and we appreciate it, and we need it, and we use it. We put it to use. It’s a matter of record that we use our revenue sharing dollars pretty much every year in our budget.”

First off, I’m bothered by the use of “pretty much,” which makes me wonder why not always? Second, when he says it’s a matter of record, don’t be fooled into thinking it’s a matter of public record. It’s not. Every club in MLB guards its numbers very closely, and you will never see the Brewers budget and be able to ascertain for yourself just where that revenue sharing money is going.

As if that weren’t enough, another issue with revenue sharing is the Net Local Revenue calculation, which is easily manipulated. Picture this…Club A’s owner is also the owner of ABC, Corp., which provides concession services. Club A hires ABC, Corp to provide concessions at its ballpark. Club A’s owner overpays ABC, Corp in order to decrease Club A’s Net Local Revenue number, thus increasing Club A’s share of revenue sharing distributions.

Haven’t had enough yet? Another example…Club B’s owner also owns XYZ Media, Inc., which airs Club B’s games locally. Club B negotiates a contract with XYZ Media, Inc. where XYZ Media, Inc. underpays for its contract to air Club B’s games locally, thus lowering its Net Local Revenue number and increasing its share of revenue sharing distributions.

Oh, and if you’re still feeling bad for the Brewers and the other small market teams, consider this: in 2002 three teams were sold and bought. The Red Sox, who are obviously in a large market, sold for $380m (taking on about $40m in debt). The New York Mets, another large market team, sold for $391m. The Marlins, the poster child for small market teams, sold for $158m. Ever heard you get what you pay for?

Luxury Tax

After the infamous strike of 1994, the owners also managed to introduced the luxury tax after being defeated on the salary cap by the MLBPA. Most people think it was aimed directly at Steinbrenner and his seemingly endless wallet, and most people are right.

The only thing the luxury tax has in common with revenue sharing, aside from hitting the Yankees wallet the hardest, is that they made it way too complicated in the 1996 CBA. The luxury tax was only implemented under that CBA for 1997, 1998 and 1999. Thresholds were set and any team who exceed the threshold paid the tax:

  • 1997: $51 million threshold (35% tax on amount over threshold)
  • 1998: $55 million threshold (35% tax on amount over threshold)
  • 1999: $58.9 million threshold (34% tax on amount over threshold)

Simple, right? Yep, so they had to make it a little more complex. Enter the “floating threshold” concept. At the end of each season, if the midpoint between the fifth and sixth highest payrolls was more than the threshold, then that became the new threshold. Then, the threshold for the next year would be adjusted based on that number.

Now even if you can grasp all that, the definition of Actual Club Payroll is sneaking in at stage left to really complicate matters. Actual Club Payroll is 1/28th (there were only 28 clubs then) of player benefit costs, player salaries and other amounts like bonuses and deferred compensation. Throw in that some players are only with the team for part of the year, or have a contract that doesn’t specify amounts for each individual year, and you really have a mess on your hands.

Requests can be made within MLB or by the MLBPA with regards to how the acquisition of a player might affect a club’s payroll total. This was meant to make the luxury tax figure into a club’s decision to sign a player. It was assumed most clubs would try to avoid the penalty. However, the floating threshold concept got in the way in the beginning. The very first year the tax was in effect, 13 clubs were over the midpoint between the fifth and sixth highest payroll and were hit with the tax.

Before I get into how the tax has evolved, I should clarify where the money goes. Under the 1996 CBA, the first $10m went to compensate for any issues with the revenus sharing plan (such as running short under the Hybrid Plan), the next $7m went to the 5 AL clubs and 5 NL clubs with the lowest Local Revenue, the next $3m went to the Industry Growth Fund (which funds training camps and other baseball development activities domestically and internationally), and the next $2.5m went to fund a reserve for any overpayments made into the system. In the end, $30.9m was collected under the 1996 CBA.

The 2002 CBA saw the luxury tax become the competitive balance tax and introduced a somewhat new system. Much higher thresholds were set for 2003-2006:

  • 2003: $117m
  • 2004: $120.5m
  • 2005: $128m
  • 2006: $136.5m

Increasing penalties for repeats offenders was also introduced, making it clear that the tax was meant as a deterrent and a penalty:

  • 2002 First-Time Offenders: 17.5%
  • 2003 First-Time Offenders: 22.5%
  • Second-Time Offenders: 30%
  • Third-Time Offenders: 40%

The distribution of funds also evolved, no longer providing for funding to low revenue clubs, thus distinguishing it entirely from revenue sharing. The first $5m would go to refund for any miscalculaations, then 50% would go to player benefits, 25% to the Industry Growth Fund, and 25% to developing baseball in countries without high school programs.

The 2006 CBA kept the basic model of the 2002 CBA with adjustments for thresholds and taxation amounts:

  • 2007: $148m
  • 2008: $155m
  • 2009: $162m
  • 2010: $170m
  • 2011: $178m

Penalties also increased:

  • First-Time Offenders: 22.5%
  • Second-Time Offenders: 30%
  • Third-Time Offenders: 40%

Distributions remain roughly the same and continued the trend towards fudning player benefits with the tax money. The first $2.5m is set aside for refunds, then 75% for player benefits and 25$ to the Industry Growth Fund. Thus, the tax is not distributed to low revenue clubs.

Now back to the statements by Mr. Lacques and Mr. Marchand. The Yankees have not paid 92% of the total amount of revenue sharing distributed. They have, however, paid 92% of the luxury/competitive balance tax over the years. They are the only club to have paid the tax each and every year since its inception.

If you want to understand more about these provisions and how they evolved, you can check out my article in the University of Denver Sports and Entertainment Law Journal here. I’m also covering all of this in my book, which is coming soon!


Kristi DoshKristi Dosh runs It's a Swing and a Miss, and is both an attorney and a student of the game of baseball.  For the past three years, Kristi has contributed to the Braves blog Chop ‘n Change.  Kristi is also the author of Can Money Still Buy the Postseason in Major League Baseball?: a 10-year retrospective on revenue sharing and the luxury tax, published by the University of Denver Sports & Entertainment Law Review (2007).  Currently, Kristi is working on a book that will expand upon the ideas considered in her previous legal journal article.

Kristi guest lectures on the topics of revenue development, revenue sharing, collective bargaining and various other topics related to administration and economics in Major League Baseball to both undergradute and graduate students on a regular basis.

Kristi holds a Bachelor of Arts in Politics from Oglethorpe University and  Juris Doctor from the University of Florida.  Kristi resides in Atlanta, where she can easily attend Atlanta Braves, Gwinnett Braves and Rome Braves games.  She is on a number of boards, including the Advisory Board for L.E.A.D.,  a revolutionary inner-city baseball program in Atlanta.

 
 
Banner

Poll

Should MLB Force Jeffery Loria to Sell the Marlins?